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Regulating Choice: A Constitutional
Law Response to Professor John A.
Robertson's Children of Choice
Ann MacLean Massle*
L Introduction
To begin, I would like to add my applause to others' for Professor John
A. Robertson's splendid new book, Children of Choice: Freedom and the
New Reproductive Technologies.' Professor Robertson sets forth a
comprehensive and coherent theory for the formation of social policy
respecting the use of artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization (IVF), and
surrogacy contracts as means for achieving parenthood. Along the way, he
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. A.B.,
Duke University; M.A., University of Michigan; J.D., University of Virginia. I owe a
tremendous debt of gratitude to the Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee
University School of Law, and the Law Center Committee for their financial and personal
support m the execution of a symposium in an area of particular interest to me, bioethics.
Most especially, I would like to thank Professor Brian C. Murchison of the Washington and
Lee Umversity School of Law, then Director of the Frances Lewis Law Center, for his warm
friendship and tireless efforts in planning the symposium, coordinating the work of the
participants, arranging the countless minute details, and seeing the project through to its
successful conclusion, even after Ins tenure in office had officially expired. The new Director
of the Frances Lewis Law Center, Professor David K. Millon of the Washington and Lee
University School of Law, provided support and assistance with last-minute details. The
editors of the Washington and Lee Law Review played an integral role at every stage. I am
grateful to Professor Randall P Bezanson, at that tune Dean of the Washington and Lee
University School of Law, for his valuable comments and advice, both before and after
completion of a prior draft. I am also grateful to Professors Joan M. Shaughnessy and Allan
Ides of the Washington and Lee University School of Law for their helpful critiques of an
earlier version of this manuscript. Finally, I would like to thank my patient and extremely
capable research assistant, Lindsay B. King, without whose help this project would not have
materialized.
1. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TEcHNOLOGIEs back jacket cover (1994) (quoting five prominent ethicists in
philosophy, law, and medicine who praise Robertson's book and note its importance).
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applies the same framework of values to an examination of collateral issues
raised by the new reproductive technologies - the development and use of
Norplant and RU486, embryo research, cryopreservation and discard, and
techniques and uses of genetic screening and manipulation. The whole is a
prodigious accomplishment, presenting a cohesive and unified philosophy
that will enlighten policymakers and enliven the public debate on technolog-
ical advances that are already changing dramatically the landscape of
reproductive possibilities open to infertile couples who are so diligently, and
often desperately, seeking assistance in order to have their own biologically
related children.2 This Symposium promises to be only one sample of the
wide-ranging response that Children of Choice is certain to receive.
Professor Robertson's central thesis is the primacy of "procreative
liberty - the freedom to decide whether or not to have offspring and to
control the use of one's reproductive capacity "I Noting that "this value is
widely acknowledged when reproduction occurs au naturel,"4 the author
states that "it should be equally honored when reproduction requires
technological assistance."' In Robertson's view, "procreative liberty
deserves presumptive respect because of its central importance to individual
meaning, dignity, and identity";6 hence, his succinctly stated proposition: "I
propose that procreative liberty be given presumptive priority in all conflicts,
2. Although the actual incidence of infertility has not significantly increased in recent
years, except in the group of married couples with wives 20 to 24 years old, the number of
office visits to private physicians for treatments for infertility has risen from about 600,000
in 1968 to about 1.6 million in 1984, with a particularly sharp increase between 1980 and
1983. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND
SOCIAL CHOICES 55 (1988) [hereinafter OTA, INFERTILrTY]. This increase is due in part to
both the increasing number of physicians providing infertility services and the new
reproductive technologies used to treat infertility. See id. at 56. A survey by the Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) estimated that "172,000 women underwent artificial
insemination m 1986-87, at an average cost of $953, resulting in 35,000 births from artificial
insemination by husband (AIH), and 30,000 births from artificial insemination by donor
(AID)." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, ARTIFCIAL INSEVmATION:
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1988) [hereinafter OTA, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION].
The OTA also estimated that nearly 600 babies had been born through surrogacy arrangements
by 1988. OTA, INFERTILITY, supra, at 267 7/me estimated that over 2000 births resulted
from surrogacy arrangements between 1987 and 1990. And Baby Makes Four, TIME, Aug.
27, 1990, at 53; see also ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 98 (citing recent statistical increases
in usage of reproductive technologies).
3. ROBERTSON, supra note I, at 16.
4. Id. at 4.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 16.
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with the burden on opponents of any particular technique to show that
harmful effects from its use justify limiting procreative choice."7
Given this hypothesis, "[a] central question in this enterprise is to
determine whether effects on embryos, families, women, and other
participants rise to the level of severity necessary to justify mfrmgmg a basic
right."I Professor Robertson concedes that "what counts as the 'substantial
harm' that justifies interference with procreative choice may often be
contested, " but he devotes substantial portions of the book to arguments that
almost no conceivable countermterest actually sustains the burden of proving
the sufficiency of its importance. In Robertson's words, "it is difficult to
show that the alleged harms of noncoital reproduction are sufficient to justify
overriding procreative liberty "10
The evaluation of any alleged harm rests initially, m Robertson's view,
on a distinction "between harms to individuals and harms to personal
conceptions of morality, right order, or offense."" Professor Robertson
dismisses the latter concerns in almost every instance, for in a pluralistic
society, "[a] majoritarian view of 'right' reproduction or 'right' valuation of
prenatal life, family, or the role of women should not suffice to restrict
actions based on differing individual views of such preeminently personal
issues. '"2 Thus, the "presumptive priority" of procreative liberty "will give
persons directly involved the final say about use of a particular technology,
unless tangible harm to the interests of others can be shown.""
One might think, as do a number of commentators, that the well-being
of the children resulting from assisted conception would constitute precisely
the sort of weighty counterinterest that could justify restrictions on the
procreative liberty of adult would-be parents whenever there were grounds
to think that the use of reproductive technologies might threaten or
7 Id.
8. Id. at 17
9. Id. at24.
10. Id. at 40.
11. Id. at41.
12. Id. Robertson does, however, concede that "[a]t a certain point, a practice such
as cloning, enhancement, or intentional diminishment of offspring may be so far removed
from even pluralistic notions of reproductive meaning that they leave the realm of protected
reproductive choice." Id., see also id. at 149-72 (addressing these extreme situations). But
see John A. Robertson, The Question of Human Cloning, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr.
1994, at 6, 9-14 (defending cloning on grounds similar to arguments generally used in
Children of Choice).
13. ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 41-42.
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jeopardize the welfare of resulting offspring. 4 Professor Robertson readily
admits that impact on offspring is an important consideration,"5 but he
14. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS
OF PARENTING 229 (1993) ("If we really care about children, we should question why there
is so much talk of the adult's right to procreate, right to control his or her body, and right to
parent, but so little talk of the child's right to anything."); OTA, INFERTILITY, supra note 2,
at 226-28; id. at 234 ("Whether or not future children can be seen as having rights, society
has an obligation to protect them in reasonable ways from foreseeable harms, and States and
the Federal Government have some constitutional authority to do so."); George J. Annas,
Regulating the New Reproductive Technologies, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990's 411,
418 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989) [hereinafter Annas, Regulating] (arguing that
government may have large role in regulating new reproductive technologies - "not only
protecting interests of the adults in quality services and informed consent, but also taking
reasonable steps to protect the interests of future children that are 'created' by these
methods"); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Protecting the Unconceived: Nonexistence, Avoidability, and
Reproductive Technology, 31 ARIz. L. REv 487, 548 (1989) ("[Ilnjuries which are likely to
deny a child a reasonable opportunity for minimal health and happiness may harm the child,
even if that life is not worse than death. If so, intervention to prevent the implementation of
technologies likely to cause these injuries finds support in the interests of the would-be
children."); Maura A. Ryan, The Argument for Unlimited Procreative Liberty: A Feminist
Critique, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1990, at 6, 8 (arguing that unlimited procreative
liberty protects parental desires and affords too little protection to offspring's "essential
autonomy," which is necessary for development of full personhood). For examples of
arguments against constitutional protection of surrogacy arrangements specifically, see
MARTHA FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 69-74 (expanded ed. 1990); CHRISTINE
OVERALL, ETHICS AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 185-90 (1987);
George J. Annas, Fairy Tales Surrogate Mothers Tell, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 27,
29-30 (1988); A.M. Capron & M.J. Radin, Choosing Family Law over Contract Law as a
Paradigm for Surrogate Motherhood, 16 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 34, 38-41 (1988);
Angela R. Holder, Surrogate Motherhood and the Best Interests of Children, 16 LAW, MED.
& HEALTH CARE 51, 53-54 (1988); Ann M. Massie, Restricting Surrogacy to Mamed
Couples: A Constitutional Problem?, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 506-15 (1991); Shari
O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C. L. REV 127,
143-47 (1986); Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV L. REV 1849, 1932-36
(1987); Barbara L. Keller, Comment, Surrogate Motherhood Contracts in Louisiana: To Ban
or to Regulate?, 49 LA. L. REv 143, 186-89 (1988). See also UNIF STATUS OF CHILDREN
OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT prefatory note, 9B U.L.A. 153-54 (Supp. 1994) [hereinafter
UNIF CONCEPTION ACT] (explaiinng that purpose of Act is to serve best interests of children
created by assisted conception).
15. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 13 (recognizing welfare of offspring as one of six
ethical considerations that must be taken into account in connection with use of reproductive
technologies); id. at 75-76 (discussing impact on offspring of irresponsible reproduction); id.
at 121-22 (discussing potential psychological harms to children of collaborative reproduc-
tion - i.e., those born as result of donor or surrogacy arrangements); id. at 217 ("The
important question is not what brought about conception and delivery, but what happens to
these children afterwards."); see also John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative
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invariably trumps its potential to restrict adult procreative interests by noting
that, with respect to any given child born with the use of assisted conception,
its only choice would be either existence under the limitations imposed by
the parental behavior or total nonexistence.16 Citing "wrongful life" cases
to support his views, 17 Robertson is unable to conjure up conditions under
which it would have been better for the child not to have been born at all.
For example, a child born with the help of IVF to a mother who tests
positive for the human unmunodeficiency virus (HI) may well turn out to
be HIV-positive itself and therefore destined to end a short life with an
agonizing death. 8 Even if the child escapes this fate, its mother will likely
Liberty- The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv 939, 1034 (1986)
[hereinafter Robertson, Embryos] (noting legitimacy of reasonable regulation of noncoital
technology, which enhances autonomy and protects welfare of offspring); John A. Robertson,
Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L.
REV 405, 434 (1983) [hereinafter Robertson, Procreative Liberty] ("The state's concern with
the well-being of offspring may also justify regulation.").
16. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 117 (discussing unmarred persons, persons who
have tested positive for human inmunodeficiency virus (HIV), and couples and individuals
who are unstable or unfit to be parents); id. at 253 n.40 (discussing older mothers). Indeed,
Robertson allows the presumptive primacy of procreative liberty to override interests of the
created children with respect- to virtually all reproductive technologies that implicate
procreative liberty interests. See id. at 111 (posthumous reproduction); id. at 153 (positive
selection of offspring traits); id. at 162 (germline intervention); id. at 169 (cloning).
17 See id. at 247 n.18 (citing Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Becker v.
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984));
see also id. at 75-76 (noting that children born with genetic handicaps or HIV and children
born into illegitimacy, poverty, or abusive situations might experience life as net benefit even
though it would involve some degree of suffering); id. at 85 & n.43 (noting that Tay-Sachs
disease might present strongest case for wrongful life claim); Robertson, Embryos, supra note
15, at 988-89 (explaining that wrongful life claims cannot prevail in instances of noncoital
reproduction because there is no way for individual claimant to exist except m condition about
which he complains).
18. The estimated rate of permatal transmission of HIV vanes in the medical literature
from 13% to 60%. See Clara Gabiano et al., Mother-to-Child Transmission of Human
Immunodeficiency Vins lype 1. Risk of Infection and Correlates of Transmission, 90
PEnIATRlcs 369, 369 (1992). A 1992 study indicates a mother-to-offspring transmission rate
of 23.9%. See id. at 370-71. That study notes that when a first-born child was infected, 40%
of second-born children were also infected, as compared with only 8.3% of second-born
children infected when the first-born was uninfected. See id. at 372. In a 1989 study, the rate
of permatal HIV infection was found to be approximately 30%. See Stephane Blanche et al.,
A Prospective Study oflnfants Born to Women Seropositivefor Human Immunodeficiency Virus
7ype 1, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1643, 1646 (1989). According to that study, about 20% of
the HIV-infected infants will die by the age of 18 months. See id. at 1643. In some cases,
infants infected with IV may later become seronegative, but continue to suffer from severe
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be alive for only a short period of the child's life, and we cannot be sure of
the presence of another loving adult to bring up the child. Nonetheless,
Robertson maintains that IVF services m this situation "would not harm
children who have no other way to be born, and thus may ethically be
provided if [an IVF] program is so inclined." 19
Of course, Robertson is speaking here of private climcs, which, he
notes, commonly screen out HIV-positive applicants.' But what happens if
the climc is a state actor, as so many of them are?2 If Professor Robert-
son's theory of the primacy of procreative liberty were to be not simply an
ethical framework setting the stage for public debate, but rather were to
become an established principle of constitutional law - if, m other words,
procreative liberty (defined to include the right to use reproductive
technologies to achieve biological parenthood) were to be construed as a
constitutionally protected "fundamental right," subject to restriction only in
the service of a "compelling state interest," and then only by "narrowly
tailored means"' - then, according to Professor Robertson's analysis, a
publicly supported IVF clinic would have no choice but to serve the HIV-
positive applicant. Her fundamental right "to bear or beget a child"' would
immune deficiency. See id. at 1646. In at least one case, an infant who became seronegative,
though completely symptom-free, carried the IV genome. See id. The children who become
permatally infected with IV have a very poor prognosis, and, although asymptomatic at
birth, most develop symptoms before age one. See Gwendolyn B. Scott et al., Survival in
Children with Pennatally Acquired Human Immunodeficiency rirus 2ype I Infection, 321 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1791, 1791, 1795 (1989). The median survival age for these children is 77
months. See id. at 1793.
19. ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 117
20. See id.
21. Out of the 169 U.S. facilities that offered IVF or gamete intrafallopian transfer as
of March 1988, the OTA listed at least 39 facilities that appeared to be related to state-run
institutions. See OTA, INFERTILrrY, supra note 2, at 311-20.
22. This is the traditional language of "strict scrutiny," or independent judicial review,
that describes the criteria for measuring the validity of restrictions upon constitutionally
protected rights. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 14.3, at 575 (4th ed. 1991) (discussing strict scrutiny test); id. §§ 14.26-.30(a) (discussing
right of privacy); LAURENCEH. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 11-1 to -4 (2d
ed. 1988) (discussing constitutional protections for certain "preferred rights"); id. §§ 15-9 to
-11 (discussing right of privacy); id. §§ 16-6 to -7 (discussing strict scrutiny in equal
protection/fundamental rights context).
23. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (invalidating restrictions on access
to contraceptive devices by single persons). Dictum in Justice Brennan's majority opinion in
Eisenstadt states: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
REGULATING CHOICE
override any interest that the state might assert in restricting her access to
IVF because the resulting child - whether HIV-positive or not, whether its
mother would live very long or not, and whether there were another
available lovmg adult to raise the child or not - would be better off to have
been born than not to have been born. Tis is precisely the approach that
Professor Robertson advocates as a matter of constitutional law
Before I probe thus notion, let me offer some other examples of issues
that might seem ripe for public debate, but that would be virtually foreclosed
to discussion if Professor Robertson's views of constitutional analysis
prevailed. Throughout Children of Choice, Robertson writes from the basic
assumption that reproductive technologies would be used by infertile
individuals or, more specifically, infertile couples. Elsewhere, however, he
has stated more explicitly that the effect of his interpretation of the
substantive liberty interest protected by the Constitution would be to prohibit
government regulation of the reasons for resort to assisted reproduction,u
just as the government is barred from regulating the reasons for a woman's
choice to have an abortion.' Thus, mere convemence - a woman's desire
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. This
characterization has become the banner reference describing the concept of procreative liberty.
See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640 (1974) (invalidating school
boards' mandatory unpaid maternity leave policies); see also TRIBE, supra note 22, § 15-10,
(citing cases); cf. ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 36-37 (referring to Eisenstadt language as
"[t]he most ringing endorsement of this right").
24. See Robertson, Procreative Liberly, supra note 15, at 430 ("The right of married
persons to use noncoital and collaborative means of conception to overcome infertility must
extend to any purpose, including selecting the gender or genetic characteristics of the child or
transferring the burden of gestation to another. Restricting the right of noncoital or
collaborative reproduction to one purpose, such as relief of infertility, contradicts the meaning
of a right of autonomy in procreation and also raises insuperable problems of definition and
monitoring.").
25. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (establishing that for previability
abortions, "the attending physician, m consultation with his patient, is free to determine,
without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should
be terminated. If that decision is reached, thejudgment may be effectuated by an abortion free
of interference by the State"); ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 46 ("No limits on the reasons for
abortion can be mposed prior to viability, nor can third parties be given veto power over the
woman's choice."); d. at 63 ("Roe-Casey does prohibit any inquiry into motives or reasons
for abortion, and thus probably protects conceptions and abortions designed to produce
embryos or fetal tissue for research or transplant, and even abortion on gender grounds."); 1d.
at 159 ("[U]nder Roe v. Wade the reason or indication for the abortion is irrelevant -
abortions may occur for strong or weak reasons, for major or for trivial genetic defects.");
id. at 213 ("Under Roe v. Wade, there is no limit on the reasons or motivations for previability
abortion - the pregnant woman is the sole judge of the need.").
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to remain slim, to avoid the physical burdens of pregnancy and childbirth,
or to pursue an uninterrupted career - would support a decision to hire a
gestational surrogate, for example. By contrast, the Uniform Status of
Children of Assisted Conception Act, m its proposal for legalized surrogacy
contracts, requires the precondition of functional infertility - that is, a
finding that the intended mother is unable to bear a child or unable to do so
without unreasonable risk to the child or to herself.' The Uniform Act also
requires that the intended parents m a surrogacy arrangement be "a man and
woman, married to each other."I In Children of Choice and other writings,
Professor Robertson acknowledges that the procreative liberty that he
advances inheres primarily m the marital relationship;1 however, he
advocates a constitutional reading that would protect access to reproductive
technologies by single persons and by gay or lesbian couples, as well as by
married or cohabiting heterosexual couples.29
Again, consider the controversial situation of a postmenopausal woman
who desires the unplantation of a fertilized egg into her womb so that she
may become pregnant, deliver the baby, and, most likely, rear the child.3"
26. See UNIF CONCEPTION AcT, supra note 14, § 6(b)(2), 9B U.L.A. 159 (Supp.
1994).
27 Id. § 1(3), 9B U.L.A. 155 (Supp. 1994).
28. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 35-40; Robertson, Embryos, supra note 15, at 956-
62; Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 15, at 415-18, 427-32, 459.
29. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 128 (unmarried women who are either single or
cohabitating with male or female partners); Robertson, Embryos, supra note 15, at 962-64,
1003 (unmarred persons); id. at 1031 (lesbian and single women); Robertson, Procreative
Liberty, supra note 15, at 418, 433, 459-60 (unmarried persons).
30. On July 18, 1994, a 62-year-old Italian woman, Rosanna Della Corte, gave birth to
a boy whom she named after her dead teenage son. See Italian Woman Gives Birth at 62,
WASH. POST, July 19, 1994, at A14. Dr. Severmo Antnon arranged Della Corte's pregnancy
through IVF with a donor's egg and sperm from Della Corte's husband. See id. She is the
oldest known woman ever to have given birth. See id. Dr. Antinori was also responsible for
the pregnancy of a 59-year-old British woman who gave birth to twins m December 1993. See
Bill Hewitt et al., Turning Back the Clock, PEOPLE WKLY., Jan. 24, 1994, at 37, 37 Antinon
has helped 54 women over the age of 50 become pregnant and give birth. See id. However,
he considers age 63 or age 64 to be "the outer limit" for this technique. Id. at 41. Another
Italian fertility specialist, Professor Carlo Flamigm, helped Liliana Cantadon, a 61-year-old
woman, become pregnant and give birth to a healthy baby boy. See id. at 39. Cantadori lied
to Flamigni about her age by telling him that she was only 47 See id. Rumors in the Italian
press say that she may be trying to get pregnant again. See id. The United States has also had
its share of postmenopausal pregnancies and births. Elke Archangel, a 52-year-old
postmenopausal woman, bore twins in March 1993 as a result of IVF with a 34-year-old
donor's egg. See Demse Fortino, Never Say Never, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, June 1994, at 70,
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In January 1994, a bill passed the French Senate that would prohibit the use
of reproductive options in such cases, 3 and reproductive clinics m this
country commonly use age as a screening device.32 Robertson's constitu-
tional analysis would invalidate governmental regulation on this issue and bar
a publicly funded clinic from using age as a criterion, although presumably
individualized assessment of any woman's health to ensure her reasonable
welfare during pregnancy and childbirth would be permissible prior to the
provision of assisted reproductive services.
73-74 [hereinafter Fortino, Never]. The process was conducted by Dr. Mark Sauer of the
University of Southern California (USC) IVF program in Los Angeles. See id. at 74. One
of the twins has Down's Syndrome. See id. Since 1990, 13 out of 29 women over the age
of 50 have given birth through the IVF program at USC. See Demse Fortino, Menopause and
Motherhood, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, June 1994, at 74, 74. Seven of them are grandparents
as well as new parents; five are first-time mothers. See id. Dr. Sauer predicts that the
improvements taking place in the IVF field will increase the success rate in women over age
50 from the current 30% to about 50%. See id., see also FIELD, supra note 14, at 36-37
(discussing surrogate in South Africa, Pat Anthony, who gave birth to her own triplet
grandchildren by gestating ova supplied by her daughter and fertilized by sperm of her
daughter's husband).
31. See Alexander M. Capron, Grandma? No, I'm the Mother, 24 HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 24, 25. In January 1994, France considered introducing a new
package of bills that entail some of the world's toughest restrictions on access to artificial
reproductive techniques. See Scott Kraft, France May Limit Artificial Pregnancies, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1994, at A7 If approved, the bills "would allow 'medically assisted
procreation' only to remedy sterility or to avoid the transmission of disease to the child. It
could not be used for women without partners, homosexuals or women past menopause." Id.
The laws would also provide barriers to artificial insemination and embryo implantation in
cases in which the couple intending to rear the child thereby created would have no biological
connection to the child. See id.
32. A 1987 survey of 1,473 private physicians who perform artificial insemination
revealed that 9% of the physicians had rejected applicants over 40 years old, 26% were likely
to reject such applicants, and 62% were not likely to reject such applicants. See OTA,
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, supra note 2, at 29; see also LoRi B. ANDREWS, NEW
CONCEPTIONS: A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE NEWEST INFERTILITY TREATMENTS,
INCLUDING IN VTRO FERTILIZATION, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, AND SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD 123 (1984) (noting that American clinics offering IVF in 1984 set age limit of
35 to 39 years for woman of couple); BARTHOLET, supra note 14, at 192 (noting her discovery
that only three out of about 20 IVF clinics in her personal search were willing to accept
woman over 40 years old); Capron, supra note 31, at 25 (citing, as example, Dr. Mark V
Sauer, obstetrics and gynecology professor at University of Southern California, who
pioneered use of egg donation for postmenopausal pregnancies in this country, but has chosen
55 as cutoff age); Fortino, Never, supra note 30, at 73 (citing, as example, Genetic and IVF
Institute in Fairfax, Virginia, which will not accept couples over age 41).
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All of these instances of persons desiring access to reproductive
technologies - HIV-positive women, single persons, gay or lesbian couples,
individuals or couples who do not need the service for reasons of infertility,
and women well above natural childbearing age - present situations in
which reasonable persons might well differ on issues of whether such access
ought to be permitted and in which many might consider society's stake in
the outcomes to be high. Specifically, it might well be argued that a due
regard for the welfare of the resulting children would militate in favor of
particular kinds of regulations, or at least m favor of proceeding cautiously
during the next few years as we make our way through the thorny social
considerations raised by advancing reproductive technologies.
Yet Professor Robertson's analysis would, as a matter of constitutional
law, decide for us that in each of the situations posed the would-be parent's
procreative liberty overrides competing considerations and prevents any
regulations other than those designed purely to ensure safe medical practices.
The effect of his constitutional interpretation is to foreclose debate and
remove the issues from the public forum, for, in this view, the "rights" of
adults preclude the possibility of regulation that public consensus might deem
desirable. The conversation is over before it has had a chance to begin.33
A primary objection to Professor Robertson's global approach is that it
ignores both the manner in wich constitutional interpretation comes about
and the underlying reasons for the way in which the Supreme Court
approaches constitutional questions. It is axiomatic that the Supreme Court
will address a question of constitutional interpretation only in the context of
a case or controversy, and then only when the case cannot be decided on any
other basis. The Court refuses to anticipate future (though related)
constitutional questions; instead, it insists upon deciding any constitutional
issue upon the narrowest possible grounds. 34 At least part of the reason for
the Court's adherence to this set of principles is its belief that wise and
workable constitutional doctrine can develop only through an evolutionary,
case-by-case process in wich issues are sharply focused and "pressed before
33. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 14 (1991) (arguing that assertion of rights fails to take account of social
responsibility by cutting off discussion that would potentially aid in "the process of self-
correcting learning"). As Glendon so aptly observes, "[I]n its simple American form, the
language of rights is the language of no compromise. The winner takes all and the loser has
to get out of town. The conversation is over." Id. at 9.
34. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (summarizing rules that Supreme Court has developed "for its own governance
in the cases confessedly within its jursidiction").
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the Court with that clear concreteness provided when a question emerges
precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary
argument exploring every aspect of a multi-faced situation embracing
conflicting and demanding interests."35
The body of doctrine that emerges from a line of case law can certainly
serve a predictive purpose for evaluating the validity of some instances of
proposed future action. Obviously, it can also serve as a useful springboard
for framing social policy perspectives. However, the process of extrapolat-
ing from a body of Supreme Court cases a full-blown theory of broad-based
social policy, applying that theory to a number of issues whose very form is
changing shape almost daily with the development of increasingly sophisti-
cated technology, and then insisting that all behavior within the theoretical
umbrella must be the subject of heightened constitutional protection seems
to me to be dubious at best. As the Supreme Court's jurisprudential
approach suggests, current attempts to resolve questions that are not yet fully
defined, or whose inplications we cannot yet entirely appreciate, run the
danger of leading to socially undesirable consequences if our current
resolution does not retain the flexibility to adapt to each new situation as it
comes up. Setting an entire realm of social policy into constitutional
concrete poses tis danger.
I submit, therefore, that Professor Robertson's definition of "procreative
liberty" paints with too broad a brush insofar as constitutional interpretation
is concerned. By foreclosing discussion and the possibility of social control
over issues inportant to the future of us all, he reaches results that are
unnecessary for the protection of constitutional values and undesirable from
the standpoint of public policy His glib recitation of the rubric that, from
the perspective of any individual, it is invariably better to have been born
than not to have been born makes too short a shrift of a concern central to
the reproductive technologies debate - namely, what we should do to ensure
the physical, mental, and psychological well-being of the children whom we
are deliberately bringing into existence.
Please do not misunderstand me. As a mother who would have been
devastated by infertility, I have only the strongest sympathies for those who
desperately desire to become parents and whose fondest wish is for children
with a genetic tie to at least one of the rearing parents. I am not even saying
that, as a matter of social policy, I would vote with those who would restrict
access to assisted reproduction by single persons, gay or lesbian couples, or,
35. United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961); see also TRIBE, supra note
22, §§ 3-9 to -10 (discussing ban on advisory opinions and doctrine of ripeness).
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for that matter,. any of the parties that I mentioned earlier m my chromcle of
controversial situations.
What I am saying, quite simply, is that the development of new
reproductive technologies raises issues too numerous and complex for us to
deal with - or even to foresee - all at one time. In the final chapter of
Children of Choice, Professor Robertson addresses "critiques of procreative
liberty," several -of which are represented in this Symposium.36 In
characterizing those who might disagree with him, he states that some "may
simply be more cautious."37 I would place myself in that camp. However,
there is no room for caution, or for addressing the issues piecemeal in the
public forum, if Professor Robertson is correct that "procreative liberty," as
he defines it, is a fundamental right protected by standards of strict scrutiny
under the United States Constitution. It is to that contention that I now turn.
II. The Constitutional Argument
A. Robertson's Thesis
Much of the discussion in Children of Choice of the primacy of
procreative liberty as an overriding value is couched in terms of social policy
arguments, not necessarily constitutional ones. From a purely social policy
perspective, I do not disagree with Professor Robertson that the procreative
interests of would-be parents is a primary value, worthy of a great deal of
respect and accommodation as we consider the increasing sophistication and
usage of reproductive technologies. Indeed, his "lens of procreative
liberty,"38 as he characterizes it, does provide us with "a useful framework"39
for evaluating both current issues and future developments in this rapidly
evolving area. As a matter of social policy, my disagreement with Professor
Robertson is more one of emphasis than of kind. I would endow the
procreative interests of would-be parents with a less thoroughgoing primacy
and would place more weight on the interests of the children resulting from
the use of these technologies.
36. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 220-35 (answering critiques that his rights-based
approach to procreative liberty is overly individualistic, ignores social responsibility and
community needs, fails to account for economic and class effects, and risks exploiting and
oppressing women).
37 Id. at 222.
38. Id. at 220.
39. Id. at 222.
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Where I differ from Professor Robertson is with his insistence that
procreative liberty as a constitutionally protected fundamental right should
be broadly construed m a manner that protects from all but minimal
regulation virtually any means of achieving biological parenthood for
virtually any would-be parent. Although the constitutional argument per se
is not as prominent in Children of Choice as m some of Professor Robert-
son's other writings, 40 he does advance it in Chapter 2,41 and his basic
phraseology throughout the book mirrors the constitutional parlance of
fundamental rights language.42
His examination of both Supreme Court holdings and dicta in a number
of cases leads Professor Robertson to the conclusion that "[i]n the United
States laws restricting coital reproduction by a married couple would have
to withstand the strict scrutiny applied to interference with fundamental
constitutional rights." 43 From there, he invokes equal protection reasoing
and notes that the desire of infertile couples "to have a family - to beget,
bear, and rear offspring - is as strong as m fertile couples.''I This
proposition then follows:
[I]f bearing, begetting, or parenting children is protected as part of
personal pnvacy or liberty, those expenences should be protected whether
they are achieved coitally or noncoitally In either case they satisfy the
basic biologic, social, and psychological drive to have a biologically
40. See Robertson, Embryos, supra note 15, at 954-67; Robertson, Procreative Liberty,
supra note 15, at 414-20, 427-36.
41. ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 22-42. For especially relevant sections, see id. at 28-
29, 3540.
42. There is very little difference between a declaration that any restriction upon
procreative liberty (broadly defined to include the use of assisted reproduction) must be
subjected to strict scrutiny and can be upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to support a
compelling state interest, see supra note 22 and accompanying text, and Professor Robertson's
statement that "procreative liberty [should] be given presumptive priority in all conflicts, with
the burden on opponents of any particular technique to show that harmful effects from its use
justify limiting procreative choice," ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 16. f. d. at 40-41 ("If
procreative liberty is taken seriously, a strong presumption m favor of using technologies that
centrally implicate reproductive interests should be recognized. Although procreative rights
are not absolute, those who would limit procreative choice should have the burden of
establishing substantial harm. This is the standard used in ethical and legal analyses of
restrictions on traditional reproductive decisions. Because the same procreative goals are
involved, the same standard of scrutiny should be used for assessing moral or governmental
restrictions on novel reproductive techniques.").
43. ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 36.
44. Id. at 39.
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 135 (1995)
related family Although full genetic reproduction might not exist m each
case, the interest of the couple m rearing children who are biologically
related to one or both rearing partners is so close to the coital model that
it should be treated equivalently Noncoital reproduction should thus be
constitutionally protected to the same extent as coital reproduction, with
the state having the burden of showing severe harm if the practice is
unrestricted. 45
B. The Current Constitutional Status of Procreative Liberty
1 Supreme Court Decisions
To assess Professor Robertson's arguments, it is first necessary to
determine as precisely as possible what interests the Supreme Court has
held to be subject to heightened protection under the Constitution.
Identifying the core values at stake in defined liberty interests should then
lead to logical conclusions about the potential scope of procreative liberty
as an element of the right of privacy
Professor Robertson and other commentators have accurately noted
that the Supreme Court's clearest jurisprudence in this area concerns the
right not to procreate - i.e., not to bear unwanted children.' In 1965,
Griswold v Connecticut"7 first identified a right of access to contraceptive
devices as part of a "right of privacy"4 inherent in the marital relation-
45. Id. For the viewpoint that collaborative reproductive techniques (i.e., AID,
surrogacy, or IVF with a donor embryo) are more similar to adoption than to coital
reproduction, see BARTHOLET, supra note 14, at 218-29.
46. See, e.g., OTA, INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 219-20; ROBERTSON, supra note 1,
at 28-29, 45-48; Annas, Regulating, supra note 14, at 416; Massie, supra note 14, at 502-04;
O'Brien, supra note 14, at 139-40; Robertson, Embryos, supra note 15, at 955 n.50;
Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 15, at 405 n.3, 415-16; Ryan, supra note 14, at
7; Keller, supra note 14, at 172-73.
47 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
48. See Griswold v Connecticut, 38t U.S. 479, 486 (1965) ("We deal with a right of
privacy older than the Bill of Rights - older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marrage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred."). In his opinon for the Court, Justice Douglas found
the privacy right m "penumbras, formed by emanations" from specific guarantees in the Bill
of Rights, including the First Amendment's freedom of association, the Fourth Amendment's
protection of the home from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Fifth Amendment's
self-incrimination clause, as well as the Ninth Amendment's provision concerning the retention
of unenumerated rights by the people. Id. at 484.
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ship.49 Eisenstadt v. Baird" extended the same right of privacy to single
persons in 1972.11 In 1977, Carey v. Population Services International5
2
held that minors could not be barred from purchasing contraceptives.
5 1
Meanwhile, the 1973 decision of Roe v Wade' found that the right of
privacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy,"55 at least during the first trimester.5 6 Mature
minors possess the same right;7 other minors may obtain an abortion with
parental consent or through a judicial proceeding. 8 Planned Parenthood
v Casey 9 recently reaffirmed a woman's previability abortion right,1°
although the Court softened its prior trimester framework to an undue
burden standard for evaluating government regulation.61
It is clear that the government must respect an individual's right to
prevent procreation by the use of contraception or by previability abortion,
but what is the picture when we look to the positive side of procreative
liberty - the right to procreate? As long ago as 1942, in Skinner v
49. See id. at 485-86.
50. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Justice Brennan characterized the right of privacy
expansively: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
51. See id.
52. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
53. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court
grounded the privacy right in the "Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action." Id.
56. See id. at 163.
57 See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (invalidating statute
giving parent veto power over minor's abortion decision).
58. See Bellow v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (holding that state may require
parental notification or consent, but only if it establishes judicial bypass procedure, which
must permit mature minor to make decision herself or - if she is not mature - must allow
court to decide whether abortion is in her best interest). See generally Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417 (1990) (involving judicial bypass procedure); Ohio v Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (same).
59. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
60. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2816 (1992) (joint opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
61. See id. at 2818-20.
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Oklahoma,62 the Court in dictum referred to procreation as "one of the
basic civil rights of man"'63 and noted that "marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."' Skinner,
however, was an equal protection case concerning the state's power to
render someone permanently sterile, and its reference was to natural
procreative capacity, not to procreative acts.65
Since Skinner, in construing the liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has delineated, in
Justice Powell's words, "[a] host of cases [that] have consistently
acknowledged a 'private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter.' '"66 This realm includes personal decisions "relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationslups, and child rearing and
education. "67 Accordingly, the Court has struck down policies restricting
an individual's choice of whom6 s and when to marry,69 zoning regulations
burdening rights of blood relatives to live together m a single household,' °
and laws deemed to interfere with parental rights to raise and educate
children as one sees fit.7 Although no case attempts to define a positive
right to procreate as such, recognition of such a right is certainly implicit
62. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
63. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
64. Id.
65. See id. at 536-37
66. Moore v City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.)
(quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). Justice Powell actually traces
the lineage of these cases to two decisions preceding Slanner See Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that parents have right to educate their children in
private schools); Meyer v Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (holding that state law
prohibiting foreign language instruction violates Fourteenth Amendment).
67 Carey v Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (citations omitted).
68. See Loving v Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (invalidating Virginia's
antmiscegenation statute).
69. See Zablocki v Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (invalidating statute requirmng
court's approval of marriage of resident having minor children who are not in his custody and
whom he is under legal duty to support).
70. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 499-500 (opinion of Powell, J.) (invalidating single-family
residential ordinance that defined "family" so narrowly as to prevent grandmother from living
in same house with her son and two grandsons who were cousins, not brothers).
71. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that parents
have right to educate their children in private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403
(1923) (holding that state law prohibiting foreign language instruction violates Fourteenth
Amendment).
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in Cleveland Board of Education v LaFleur,7 in which the requirements
of two school boards for extensive maternity leave were held to constitute
inpermissible burdens on a protected area of "freedom of personal choice
in matters affecting marriage and family life." 73 In his opimon for the
court, Justice Stewart specifically linked the ,pregnancy choice of the
teachers with Justice Brennan's characterization in Eisenstadt v Baird of
the right "to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child. "I Justice Stewart's reference was arguably significant for
the fact that he cited contraception cases (dealing with the right not to
procreate) to inply support for an expansive positive constitutional concept
of procreative liberty
Yet we must also keep m mind some sharp cutoff points that the Court
has earmarked in its delineation of the constitutionally protected right of
privacy In Bowers v Hardwick,75 the Court refused to characterize
homosexual behavior as an aspect of the freedom of intimate association. 76
Instead, the Court upheld a state prohibition against homosexual sodomy
on the grounds that the practice had long constituted a criminal offense and
hence did not fit within the "fundamental liberties 'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition.'"77
Again, in Michael H. v Gerald D.,78 the Court upheld a statutory
presumption of a child's legitimacy, irrebuttable by all but the marital
couple, and, in so doing, brushed aside a natural father's claim of rights
both to prove his paternity and to maintain a relationship with his daughter
under circumstances in which the mother had been married and living with
her husband at the time of the birth. 79 Claims of parental rights by natural
fathers of illegitimate children are given constitutional respect when those
fathers have participated in the child's maintenance and care.' In Michael
72. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
73. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974).
74. Id. at 640 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
75. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
76. See Bowers v Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986).
77 Id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(opinion of Powell, J.)).
78. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
79. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119-30 (1989) (opimon of Scalia, J.).
80. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (holding that denial to
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H., however, the Court found that the state policy favoring (1) the child's
interests in a status of legitimacy and (2) the preservation of the integrity
of the family unit overrode any interests that either the natural father or the
child herself might otherwise assert.8
Given the parameters of the Supreme Court's right of privacy
decisions, how are we to interpret the scope of the enunciated "right to
decide whether to bear or beget a child" '  I suggest that the answer to this
question lies in an examination of the underlying values at stake in the
decided cases. The second question is how broadly should that right
extend as questions involving the new reproductive technologies make their
way into our legal system? Although full exploration of that question is
beyond the scope of this Article, I submit that formulating the answer calls
for social policy considerations that give weight and value to concerns
beyond simply, or even primarily, the procreative liberty interests of the
affected adults.
2. Values Underlying the Decisions
Professor Robertson's reading of the privacy cases leads him to
conclude that coital reproduction within marriage is a fundamental right
subject to the highest degree of constitutional protection. 83 Because the
underlying motivations and desires are the same, he argues that noncoital
unmarried father of parental fitness hearing afforded other parents whose custody is challenged
by state violates Equal Protection Clause); see also Lehr v Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68
(1983) (holding that Equal Protection Clause does not require state to afford mothers and
fathers similar legal rights with respect to their children when father has failed to attempt to
establish relationship with child); Caban v Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392-93 (1979) (holding
that New York statute prohibiting adoption of child without natural mother's consent, but
allowing adoption of child without natural father's consent unless father can prove adoption
not to be in child's best interests, violates Equal Protection Clause when natural father has
established substantial relationship with child).
81. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 119-20 (opinion of Scalia, J.); see also id. at 125
(citing common-law presumption of legitimacy of any child born during marriage and statmg
that "[t]he primary policy rationale underlying the common law's severe restrictions on
rebuttal of the presumption appears to have been an aversion to declaring children illegitimate
A secondary policy concern was the interest in promoting the 'peace and tranquillity
of States and families'").
82. Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); see also supra notes 50-51, 74 and
accompanying text.
83. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 36; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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reproduction should receive the same degree of constitutional deference. 84
Are these conclusions justified? I submit that the first one is, but the
second one is not. The distinction becomes apparent upon an examination
of the values underlying the cases involving procreative choice.
Professor Robertson argues that the primary value at stake here is the
"central importance [of procreative liberty] to individual meaning, dignity,
and identity"' for both fertile and infertile couples. In other words, what
matters is the shared wish of both fertile and infertile couples "to replicate
themselves, transmit genes, gestate, and rear children biologically related
to them."86 The desire is the same, the motivations are the same, and the
goal is the same. Therefore, he reasons, infertile couples should have the
same protected right to noncoital reproduction that fertile couples have to
coital reproduction.' This syllogism has an appealing ring to it and, as a
social policy proposition, deserves respect if not wholesale accommodation.
In the realm of constitutional law, however, there are many instances in
which there is a sharp distinction between the degree of protection
specifically provided to a belief or motivation and the degree of protection
provided to the conduct arising from that belief or motivation.
3. The Belief/Conduct Distinction
Professor Robertson is surely correct in identifying self-fulfillment as
a major concern of the privacy cases and a key rationale underlying the
protection given to procreative choice. 88 Citing those decisions, the Casey
Court declared:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make m a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the umverse, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.89
84. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 39; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
85. ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 16.
86. Id. at 32.
87 See id. at 39.
88. See id. at 24-25.
89. Planned Parenthood v Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992).
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The primacy of beliefs to any person's self-definition, and the centrality of
freedom of self-definition to the concept of liberty generally, cannot be
gaisaid. Nor can it be denied that liberty must entail, at the very least, the
right to make certain choices about how to live one's life in a manner that
will give meaning and value to the existence of the person making the
choices. In other words, liberty must involve not only freedom of belief, but
also a meaningful opportunity to act upon the beliefs central to self-
definition.
Nonetheless, it is also true that our system of constitutional government,
for all its emphasis upon individual liberties as particularly recognized in the
Bill of Rights, has always insisted upon the importance of the distinction
between beliefs, on the one hand, and conduct stemming from those beliefs,
on the other. Beliefs often possess, for the believer, the quality of the
absolute; certainly, from the standpoint of government, they possess the
quality of the unregulable. The government may attempt to influence
beliefs, but it ultimately lacks the power either to instill or to expunge them
from the minds of those who hold them. Conduct, on the other hand, is the
stuff with which regulation is concerned. Given that beliefs are both central
to self-definition and essentially ungovernable, while conduct is both the
natural outgrowth of beliefs and the arena of regulation, the important
question becomes: To what extent must government accommodate conduct
in order to respect belief and to preserve the right of self-definition, as it
simulaneously acts in the best interests of all by promulgating regulations
that seem desirable to a majority9
I know of no thoroughgoing answer to this question - at least, not in
the developed jurisprudence of constitutional case law - but particularized
answers abound, especially in the area of First Amendment interpretation.
The Religion Clauses present a striking example of constitutional
protection for belief: Government is specifically prohibited from establish-
ing, any religion, but it is also required to respect "the free exercise
thereof."I "Exercise" is in fact an active word and might seem to connote
a component of protected conduct, as well as belief. Yet time and
again, the Supreme Court has stated that although the Free Exercise
Clause protects belief absolutely, religiously motivated conduct "remains
subject to regulation for the protection-of society "91 Thus, child labor
90. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof " Id.
91. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940); see also Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963) (stating that, although "[tl he door of the Free Exercise Clause
REGULATING CHOICE
laws, 92 universal mmunization requirements,'m and antipolygamy laws' have
all been upheld against religious objections to compliance. In each case, the
Court favored larger social values perceived to be at stake - for example,
m the polygamy cases, common notions of morality and an ordered society,
and in the immunization cases, concerns related to both the general public
health and the individual welfare of the children most directly affected.
Furthermore, challenged regulations have not necessarily been held to a
"strict scrutiny" standard of review; at least, criminal laws of general
applicability need not accommodate religiously based conduct and need not
rest upon a compelling state interest.9' Although the Religious Freedom
stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such,"
resulting conduct may be circumscribed when it poses "some substantial threat to public
safety, peace or order"); Braunfeld v Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-04 (1961) ("[Legislative
power over mere opinion is forbidden but it may reach people's actions when they are found
to be m violation of important social duties or subversive of good order, even when the actions
are demanded by one's religion."); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878)
("Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.").
92. See Prince v Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944) ("ruhe state has a wide
range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's
welfare; and this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious
conviction.").
93. See generally Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816 (Ark. 1964); Mosier v. Barren County
Bd. of Health, 215 S.W.2d 967 (Ky. 1948); Sadlock v Board of Educ., 58 A.2d 218 (N.J.
1948); Board of Educ. v. Maas, 152 A.2d 394 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959), af'd, 158
A.2d 330 (N.J.), cert. demed, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt,,
207 S.W 303 (Tex. 1918). These cases all cited Jacobson v Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905), as authority for defending compulsory immunization requirements against religious
objections. The Jacobson Court specifically stated, "According to settled principles the police
power of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established
directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety " Id.
at 25. Further, the Court stated, "Whatever may be thought of [the mandatory vaccination]
statute, it cannot be affirmed to be, beyond question, in palpable conflict with the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 31, accord Pnnce, 321 U.S. at 166-67 ("[One] cannot clain freedom from
compulsory vaccination for the-child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right
to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.").
94. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165-66 (arguing that marriage, as foundation of society,
creates social obligations and duties that must be subject to governmental regulation lest social
order be destroyed).
95. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) ("[P]recisely because we
value and protect religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming
presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that
does not protect an interest of the highest order.").
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Restoration Act of 199391 attempts to impose such a requirement, its
constitutional validity remains to be tested. In any event, the positive
protection afforded by the Free Exercise Clause arguably justifies stronger
protections for conduct stemming from religious beliefs than for conduct
that has other motivational roots. 97
Again, consider the freedom of expression. Pure expression - the
simple statement of a thought, belief, idea, or factual piece of knowl-
edge - is surely the closest thing to the holding of that thought, belief,
idea, or knowledge, and hence deserves a degree of protection almost as
absolute, as reflected in the strong requirement that government remain
viewpoint neutral in its regulatory policies. 9 Even so, simple statements
can be constrained or pumshed based upon their content in the service of
96. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
97 See, e.g., Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 891-907 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment) (taking strong issue with Court's rationale on ground that Free Exercise Clause
provides positive protection for areas of religiously motivated behavior); id. at 907-21
(Blackmn, J., dissenting) (dissenting on similar grounds). Several commentators have made
this argument. See generally Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated
Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV 993 (1990); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants
ofFree Exercise, 1990 SuP. Cr. REv 1 (arguing generally that Free Exercise Clause requires
some accommodations for religiously motivated conduct and permits others that legislatures
might decide to grant); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case
Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV 555 (1991); Ira C.
Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv 743 (1992) (arguing against
legislative accommodations for religiously motivated conduct, but also maintaining that Free
Exercise Clause requires some accommodations); Michael W McConnell, Accommodation
of Religion, 1985 SuP Cr. REV 1; Michael W McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An
Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV 685 (1992) (arguing generally
that Free Exercise Clause requires some accommodations for religiously motivated conduct
and permits others that legislatures might decide to grant).
98. See, e.g., Texas v Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.");
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 60-61 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that case law "provide[s] some support for the notion that the government
is permitted to exclude certain subjects from discussion in nonpublic forums," but "[o]nce the
government permits discussion of certain subject matter, it may not impose restrictions that
discriminate among viewpoints on those subjects whether a nonpublic forum is involved or
not"); City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976) ("[Ihe participation in public discussion of public business
cannot be confined to one category of interested individuals. To permit one side of a debatable
public question to have a monopoly in expressing its views to the government is the antithesis
of constitutional guarantees.").
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a compelling state interest, such as the national security at stake in
antiespionage statutes99 or the public order preserved by prohibitions
against incitement to riot.100
Beyond these quite specific and rare circumstances of potentially
permissible content regulation, however, speech is actually subject to a
relatively high degree of circumscription in the guise of reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations. 01 Any speaker is entitled to express her
beliefs, thoughts, ideas, or knowledge, but certainly not anywhere, at any
time, or m any manner of her choosing. Although time, place, and manner
regulations trigger a heightened standard of review, their validity does not
require a compelling state interest, and the government's burden is not
difficult to sustain, so long as the rules are applied evenhandedly 11 Even
99. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (stating, in dictum, that
prior restraint on speech might be permissible in "exceptional cases" and citing as examples
.actual obstruction to [a governinent's] recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates
of transports or the number and location of troops" during wartime, obscenity laws, and
"incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government"); see also
New York Times Co. v Umted States, 403 U.S. 713, 723 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(invalidating mjunctions prohibiting publication by two newspapers of so-called "Pentagon
Papers" on ground, inter alia, that Near test was not met). Some Justices in New York Times,
however, pointed to the possibility of appropriate criminal laws supporting postpublication
penal action. See id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 733-40 (White, J., concurring);
cf. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3, 515-16 (1980) (per curiam) (noting that
Central Intelligence Agency may act to protect substantial government interests in national
security secrets by imposing restrictions on employee activities and holding that when
employee breached agreement to submit manuscript for prepublication review, judgment
imposing constructive trust on book's profits was appropriate).
100. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (invalidating Ohio's
criminal syndicalism statute and holding that statute prohibiting advocacy of illegal conduct
is valid only if prohibited conduct is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action" and is "likely to produce such action"). The Brandenburg test was reaffirmed in Hess
v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam), in which the Court held that the test was not
met as applied to an alleged incitement to riot during a street protest. See td. at 108-09; see
also TRIBE, supra note 22, § 12-9.
101. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294
(1984) ("[Rleasonable time, place, or manner regulations normally have the purpose and direct
effect of limiting expression but are nevertheless valid.").
102. See, e.g., id. at 293 ("Expression, whether oral or written or symbolized by
conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. We have often noted that
restrictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication
of the information."). The requirement of a "significant governmental interest" (rather
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the quintessential public forums need not remain constantly available:
Public parks are commonly closed from dusk to dawn to protect the public
safety, the need for streets to serve vehicular traffic justifies permit
requirements,"m and the authorities can insist that public sidewalks remain
sufficiently clear for pedestrian use.104 The use of sound enhancement
devices is clearly subject to reasonable regulation in the service of the
public peace. 5 Notice that the more it is possible to characterize the
subject matter of the regulation as "conduct" - even "expressive con-
duct" - rather than as "pure speech," the more likely it is that a regulation
will be upheld;106 hence, the Court's close attention to the appropriate
characterization of such activities as draft card burning, 0 7 the wearing of
than "compelling") is the language of an intermediate standard of judicial review. See
also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) ("Lest any confusion on the
point remain, we reaffirm today that a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected
speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral
interests but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so."); id.
at 798-99 n.6 ("While time, place, or manner regulations must be 'narrowly tailored' m
order to survive First Amendment challenge, we have never applied strict scrutiny in this
context.").
103. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969)
(invalidating ordinance requiring permit for parade or demonstration on overbreadth grounds,
but noting permissibility of properly drawn statute); Cox v New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
575-76.(1941) (upholding license requirement for parade or procession on public street after
state supreme court narrowly construed statute to limit discretion of licensing authority to
appropriate time, place, and manner considerations).
104. See, e.g., Madsen v Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2526 (1994)
("The State has a strong interest in promoting the free flow of traffic on public streets
and sidewalks ").
105. See generally Ward, 491 U.S. 781; City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789 (1984); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
106. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) ("The government generally
has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or
spoken word."); Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 152 ("[Ihe First and Fourteenth Amendments
[do not] afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct
such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments
afford to those who commuicate ideas by pure speech." (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 555 (1965)) (second brackets added by Court)).
107 See Umted States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (upholding congressional
prohibition of draft card burning in face of claim that activity was undertaken as form of
political protest and noting that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the
same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest m regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms").
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black armbands, °8 and flag burmng. 1'
The privacy cases themselves also leave broad scope for the regulation
of conduct. Although the cases most directly related to procreative liberty
speak in terms of the "right to decide whether to bear or beget a child"110
(a mental process), the holdings fall far short of protecting all possible
behaviors related to that choice. Instead, the cases defining constitutionally
protected conduct invariably implicate not only the value of self-fulfillment
or self-definition, but one or more other values as well. Generally, these
values are characterizable either as respect for an individual's bodily
integrity or as social concerns related to the privacy of marital intimacy and
the integrity of the family unit.
Bodily integrity is one of the chief values particularly identified for
protection in the contraception and abortion cases. Both Eisenstadt and
Carey struck down contraception restrictions partly on the basis that the
state had no right to punish concededly illicit sexual conduct by imposing
on the miscreant the physical burdens of pregnancy and the birth of an
unwanted child.' Roe v Wade and other abortion cases expressed similar
concerns. 112 These decisions comport with others in which the Court has
108. See Tinker v Des Momes Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06
(1979) (holding that wearing of black armbands by school students could not be prohibited or
punished because activity was "akin to 'pure speech'" and neither students nor teachers "shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate").
109. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1990) (holding Flag Protection
Act of 1989 unconstitutional as content-based regulation of expressive conduct). The Eichman
Court specifically based its holding upon Texas v. Johnson, in which the Court determined
that, unlike the statute in O'Brien, a Texas anti-flag-burning law was "related to the
suppression of free expression" and therefore was outside the more lenient O'Brien test. See
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407
110. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
111. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694-95 (1977) (citing
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448, and referring generally to cases supporting abortion rights of
minor women as protective of bodily integrity). See generally Planned Parenthood v
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (supporting abortion rights of minor women as protective of
bodily integrity).
112. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (detailing aspects of "[tihe
detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice
altogether"); see also TRIBE, supra note 22, § 15-10, at 1340 (stating that "it is difficult to
imagine a clearer sense of bodily intrusion" than requiring woman to carry child to term); cf.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992) ("Her suffering is too intimate
and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role
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protected persons against unwanted surgery or other procedures invasive
of bodily integrity 11 Taken as a whole, this body of law would surely
severely restrict or prohibit altogether such practices as state-mandated
sterilization, contraception, or abortion - freedom from which constitutes
another aspect of procreative liberty'14 - as well as protect access to those
procedures performed consensually
Values related to protecting the intimacy of the marriage relationship
and the integrity of the family umt form another central concern of the
privacy cases. They are the entire focus of Gnswold v Connecticut"' and
of decisions already cited relating to the "private realm of family life." ' 6
Interestingly, the value of marital integrity provides a key rationale for the
major restriction on parenting rights in Michael H. v Gerald D .7 In that
case, the Court permitted California to protect an ongoing marriage against
the assault represented by the natural father's assertion of paternal rights
to a child born during the marriage."'
113. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (holding that surgical intrusion
into defendant's body to retrieve bullet fired by victim was unreasonable under Fourth
Amendment when medical risks were disputable); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73
(1952) (holding that use of morphine capsules as evidence against defendant violated Due
Process Clause when capsules were obtained by force and against defendant's will through
stomach pump).
114. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 36-38; see also id. at 69-93 (concluding that forced
use of Norplant to curb irresponsible reproduction violates procreative liberty and bodily
integrity and may only be justified in case of severe mental retardation). Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200 (1927), upheld the validity of a Virginia statute that authorized forced sterilization
of people with hereditary forms of mental illness when such sterilization was deemed to be m
the best interests of the mentally defective person and society. See id. at 207 Although Buck
has never been overruled, it is generally conceded that in light of the dictum in Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text, and the other
right to privacy cases, see supra notes 47-81 and accompanying text, the Buck decision would
be unlikely to be upheld today. See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 22, § 14.27, at
759 ("[It is doubtful that the Supreme Court would follow Buck v. Bell today If the justices
can find no compelling interest to justify the prohibition of abortions, any state interest in
sterilization should be held insufficient to impair this fundamental right."); TRIBE, supra note
22, § 15-10, at 1340 ("ilt is hard to square the basic philosophy of Skinner v. Oklahoma with
the proposition that the state may usurp the individual's procreative choices in an irreversible
way - whether by sterilization or by compulsory breeding." (footnote omitted)).
115. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
116. Moore v City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (quoting Prince v
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)); see supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
117 491 U.S. 110 (1989); see supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
118. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129-30 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.).
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The marriage relationship, with its concomitant intimacy, thus lies at
the heart of the constitutionally protected right of privacy Within the
context of marriage, consensual behavior that might normally be expected
to result in procreation - in other words, coital reproduction - certainly
comes within the ambit of this protection.
Notice, however, that with respect to other so-called "procreative
liberty" decisions, this syllogism does not apply The Court has made very
clear, for example, that outside the context of the marriage relationship,
protection of the right of access to contraception does not mean protection
of the right to engage in the behavior that makes contraception necessary
or desirable," 9 particularly in the case of minors. 2 ' Thus, laws against
fornication and adultery and those prohibiting sexual activities with or on
the part of minors are perfectly valid. Similarly, the abortion cases,
although protecting the rights of a woman to bodily integrity against the
burden of an unwanted pregnancy, have specifically refused to hold that
"one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases."'I
119. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972) (stating that state can
constitutionally regulate extramarital and premarital sexual relations); d. at 449 (noting that
legislature has "a full measure of discretion in fashioning means to prevent fornication");
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("The State
of Connecticut does have statutes, the constitutionality of which is beyond doubt, which
prohibit adultery and formcation."); id. at 505 (White, J., concurring) ("[Tihe statute is said
to serve the State's policy against all forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships, be
they premarital or extramarital, concededly a permissible and legitimate legislative goal.");
Poe v Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The laws regarding
marriage forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices confining
sexuality to lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social
life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis."); id. at 552-53
("The right of privacy most manifestly is not an absolute. Thus, I would not suggest that
adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from criminal enquiry, however
privately practiced. So much has been explicitly recognized in acknowledging the State's
rightful concern for its people's moral welfare.").
120. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 707 (1977) (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("[jT]he relevant question m any case where state laws impinge on the freedom of
action of young people in sexual matters is whether the restriction rationally serves valid state
interests."); id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I would describe as 'frivolous' appellees'
argument that a minor has the constitutional right to put contraceptives to their intended use,
notwithstanding the combined objection of both parents and the State."); d. at 719 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (arguing that Court's action amounted to demal of state's power to deter sexual
conduct among unmarried minors and declaring it "departure from a wise and heretofore
settled course of adjudication to the contrary").
121. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
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The clear message is that not all procreative behavior is subject to the
heightened protection of the constitutional right of privacy The next
question is whether the special privacy right that inheres in the marriage
relationslup nonetheless encompasses all consensual procreative behavior,
including use of the means of assisted reproduction.
I submit that the answer is no. Unlike coital reproduction, assisted
reproduction does not directly implicate the values - bodily integrity,
marital intimacy, or integrity of the family unit - that are central to the
privacy cases. Heightened protection is not triggered simply by the fact that
any particular conduct represents a search for meaning in life or because the
persons involved are seeking self-fulfillment central to their self-definition.
When invoked, those values have proven to be an insufficient basis for a
claim to constitutional protection of the resulting behavior. In Bowers v
Hardwick, Justice Blackmun's dissent vehemently called upon these values
to protect, as part of the right of intimate association, the conduct prohibited
by Georgia's antisodomy statute." The majority, however, disagreed and
noted that "[t]he law is constantly based on notions of morality "1
4. Conclusions
The foregoing examination of the values that underlie existing privacy
cases, and of the criteria pertinent to the regulation of other constitutionally
protected rights involving beliefs central to the individual, leads to several
conclusions germane to the current discussion. First, it is clear that within
the context of marriage, both the consensual behavior and the choices
involved in the natural process of "bearing or begetting" children receive full
constitutional protection. Second, absent its compelling interest in a viable
fetus, the government may not intervene in the reproductive choices of
individuals (married or single) in a manner that intrudes upon their bodily
integrity Finally, the cases suggest that the state may constitutionally
regulate reproductive behavior outside the particular context of marital
intimacy Apparently, it may ground that regulation in values that the
legislature deems sufficiently significant, including common concepts of
morality
Whether as a question of constitutional interpretation or as a point of
public policy, one could easily disagree with the outcome in Bowers v
Hardwick, and indeed with the notion of regulating any intimate behavior
122. See Bowers v Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204-06 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 196.
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between two consenting adults when there is no danger of direct harm to any
third person. That disagreement finds a strong foundation in the values
invoked by Justice Blacknun m his Bowers dissent and by Professor
Robertson in Is defense of procreative liberty- namely, the right to seek
one's self-fulfillment through choices that will give meaning and value to
one's life." However, as important as these values are and as central as
they may be to a satisfying definition of liberty, the conduct to which they
lead must be subject to appropriate circumscription when the welfare of a
third person nught be endangered or undermined by the actor's unrestrained
choice. A potential detrimental effect of an individual's behavior upon a
third person is necessarily of concern from a public policy perspective; in
constitutional parlance, it may often rise to the level of a state interest
sufficiently significant to justify regulation designed to prevent the perceived
harm.
Professor Robertson himself concedes that sufficient harm to a third
party's interests is an appropriate limit on procreative liberty; z however, he
repeatedly. discounts the notion of harm to the third parties most directly
affected by an individual's or a couple's use of reproductive technologies -
namely, the resulting children." I believe that Robertson underplays the
124. See id. at 204-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 24-25.
125. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 17 ("A central question in this enterprise is to
determine whether effects on embryos, families, women, and other participants rise to the
level of severity necessary to justify infringing a basic right."); id. at 37 ("Restrictions on
marital reproduction are theoretically possible only if the state can show great harm to others
from the reproduction in question."); d. at 41-42 (noting that harm necessary to justify
infringing one's procreative liberty by restricting access to reproductive technolbgies must be
both tangible and substantial); id. at 58 ("At viability the fetus's advanced development
lends itself to a more objective valuation of its interests,-and the woman's interest in ending
pregnancy can be limited."); itd. at 72 ("[D]ecisions to reproduce should be viewed as
presumptive rights that are subject to limitation only upon the showing of substantial harm to
the interests of others."); itd. at 178 ("Even if determinative of a decision to reproduce
neither the core values that underlie procreative liberty nor any other protected liberty includes
the right to make offspring less than healthy and normal, when a healthy birth is reasonably
possible."); t. at 179 ("At a certain point one's right to use one's body as one wishes
must take account of the interests of others whose needs those decisions directly impinge.");
t. at 221 ("Procreative choices that clearly harm the tangible interests of others are subject
to regulation or even prohibition."); id. at 224 ("If harmful effects are clearly established
public concerns may take pribrity over private choice.").
126. See itd. at 50 ("[A] high standard of justification should be met to warrant overriding
the woman's presumptive right to end pregnancy."); id. at 153 ("The risk of harmful effects
does not undercut the presumptive importance of [genetic trait] selection as part of
reproductive choice, even if analysis of particular cases shows sufficient harm to justify
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interests of the children deliberately created by assisted reproduction and m
so doing neglects a primary value that must be given due weight in any
responsible social policy concerning these "children of choice." Because my
perception of the scope of constitutional protection for procreative choice is
narrower than his, I would like to share a few thoughts on tis issue from a
public policy perspective.
II. The Welfare of Third Parties: The Interests
of "Children of Choice"
Throughout Children of Choice, whenever Professor Robertson
contemplates any potentially negative effects of adults' reproductive choices
on the resulting children, he favors the adults' procreative liberty on the
ground that, from the standpoint of the children, the only alternative is
nonexistence, and it is always "better to have been born than not to have
been born. "17 Tis rubric decides the issue for hun: The adults have a
fundamental right "to decide whether to bear or beget a child", the children
have no fundamental right to nonexistence and undoubtedly would not
choose it if they could.
It seems to me that this approach is conceptually flawed and morally
inadequate. The concept stems from so-called "wrongful life" cases. In
these cases, disabled children have sought recovery in damages from
physicians or genetic counseling services on the ground that their parents
were negligently misinformed about the likelihood of the children's severe
disabilities - knowledge that would have caused the parents to decide to
abort or never to conceive." Although three jurisdictions have allowed
limiting the right to select." (emphasis added)); id. at 221 ("With this approach we have
seen that there are few instances in which the feared harms of the new technology are
compelling enough to justify restrictive legal intervention (though the need for responsible use
remains)."); id. at 222 ("[Mlany of the concerns and fears will, upon closer analysis, turn out
to be speculative fears or symbolic perceptions that do not justify infringing core procreative
interests.").
127 See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (describing "wrongful life" argument
and citing cases).
128. See generally Turpin v Sortin, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) (in bank); Gami v
Mullikin Medical Ctr., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819 (Ct. App. 1993); Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab.,
165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980); Smith v Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Procanik v
Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984); Berman v Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Gleitman v
Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N..Y 1978);
Flanagan v. Williams, 623 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Speck v Finegold, 408 A.2d
496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979), at'd, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981); Nelson v Krusen, 678 S.W.2d
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child plaintiffs to recover the special expenses of their extraordinary care and
training,12 9 no court has awarded general damages for the alleged "injury"
of life itself. The courts reason that life, even under the very limiting
conditions m which it may be experienced by the severely disabled, is
preferable to nonexistence - in other words, it is "better to have been born
than not to have been born."'"3 Tis conclusion is augmented by the mind-
boggling nature of the task of assessing general damages. If the function of
a tort award is to place the plaintiff m the position in which she would have
been absent the injury, how can a jury compare the value of a state of
nonexistence with the value of the child's impaired life?13 1 The fact that
918 (Tex. 1984); Harbeson v Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
129. So far, the state supreme courts in California, New Jersey, and Washington have
permitted special damage recoveries in wrongful life suits. See generally Turpin v Sortimi,
643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) (in bank) (involving congenital deafness); Gami v. Mullikin Medical
Ctr., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819 (Ct. App. 1993) (involving spina bifida and following Turpin);
Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980) (involving Tay-Sachs
disease and anticipating Turpin); Procanik v Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984) (involving
congenital rubella syndrome); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983) (en
bane) (involving fetal hydantom syndrome).
130. See, e.g., Turpin v Sortim, 643 P.2d 954, 961 (Cal. 1982) (in bank) ("[S]ome
courts have concluded that the plaintiff has suffered no legally cognizable injury on the ground
that considerations of public policy dictate a conclusion that life - even with the most severe
of impairments - is, as a matter of law, always preferable to nonlife."); Berman v Allan,
404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979) ("One of the most deeply held beliefs in our society is that life -
whether experienced with or without a major physical handicap - is more precious than non-
life."); Timothy J. Dawe, Note, Wrongful Life: Time for a "Day in Court," 51 OHIO ST. L.J.
473, 483 (1990) (discussing Gleitman v Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967), and noting
that, "[i]n denying the parents' claim for wrongful birth, the court demonstrated an
overwhelming preference for life over nonexistence, no matter what the conditions of that
life.").
131. See, e.g., Turpin, 643 P.2d at 961 ("Because nothing defendants could have done
would have given plaintiff an unimpaired life, it appears inconsistent with basic tort principles
to view the injury solely by reference to plaintiff's present condition without taking into
consideration the fact that if defendants had not been negligent she would not have been born
at all."); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 763 (N.J. 1984) ("The crux of the problem is that
there is no rational way to measure non-existence or to compare non-existence with the pain
and suffering of impaired existence."); Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 692 ("By asserting that he
should not have been born, the infant plaintiff makes it logically impossible for a court to
measure his alleged damages because of the impossibility of making the comparison required
by compensatory remedies."); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y 1978) ("[A
wrongful life claim] demands a calculation of damages dependent on a comparison between
the Hobson's choice of life in an impaired state and nonexistence. This comparison the law
is not equipped to make."); Nelson v Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984) ("[IThe
cause of action unavoidably involves the relative benefits of an impaired life as opposed to no
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damages must be mitigated by the value of any benefit conferred, when that
benefit is life itself, adds to the complexity of the problem. 132
As a number of judges and commentators have suggested, however, the
tenet in wrongful life cases that existence is always preferable to nonexis-
tence is not offered as a factual conclusion about each individual; rather, it
is a statement of public policy based upon respect for the sanctity of human
life in general and offered to support a jurisprudential conclusion that
"wrongful life" is simply not an injury cogmzable in the law 133 Professor
life at all. All courts, even the ones recognizing a cause of action for wrongful life, have
admitted that this calculation is impossible."); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483,
496 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) ("[M]easuring the value of an impaired life as compared to
nonexistence is a task that is beyond mortals.").
132. See, e.g., Turpin, 643 P.2d at 964 ("[fit must be recognized that as an incident of
defendant's negligence the plaintiff has in fact obtained a physical existence with the capacity
both to receive and give love and pleasure as well as to experience pain and suffering.
Because of the incalculable nature of both elements of this harm-benefit equation a
reasoned, nonarbitrary award of general damage is simply not obtainable."); Nelson v
Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex. 1984) ("[B]ecause in awarding damages the court must
offset any special benefits to the plaintiff resulting from the negligence, such a cause of action
involves a weighing of life against non-life, a calculation that cannot be rationally made."
(citation omitted)); Dawe, supra note 130, at 479-80 ("In wrongful life claims, then, the child
usually asserts as 'general' damages the pain and suffering he will endure during his lifetime
as a result of the defect, but presumably less the benefits he will derive from his existence, if
any. This 'net burden' is then measured not against the value of a 'normal' life, but against
the nullity of nonexistence.").
133. See, e.g., Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 486 (Ct. App. 1980)
("Public policy, as perceived by most courts, has been utilized as the basis for denying
recovery; in some fashion, a deeply held belief in the sanctity of life has compelled some
courts to deny recovery to those among us who have been born with serious impairment.");
Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 760 (N.J. 1984) ("[P]olicy considerations have led [the
Supreme Court of New Jersey] in the past to decline to recognize any cause of action m an
infant for his wrongful life."); Flanagan v Williams, 623 N.E.2d 185, 191 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993) ("The common and statutory law of Ohio places an intrinsic value on life. In the
absence of guidance from the Supreme Court or the General Assembly, we are not prepared
to say that life, even with severe disabilities, constitutes actionable injury."); Nelson, 678
S.W.2d at 924 ("At heart, the reluctance of these courts [to award damages for being alive]
is based on the 'high value which the law has placed on human life, rather than its absence.'"
(quoting Becker v Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978)); Alexander M. Capron,
Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLuM. L. REv 618, 650 (1979) ("In [denying
damages for wrongful life], courts are not announcing purely rational conclusions derived
from legal principles but are instead proclaiming their personal views on certain value-laden
'facts.'"); Peters, supra note 14, at 506-09 (discussing concern of courts that nonexistence
comparison in wrongful life claims would weaken social respect for life); Dawe, supra note
130, at 493 ("[Mlost of the rationales used by courts to reject wrongful life claims have been
variations or extensions of a basic 'sanctity of life' argument.").
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Robertson, however, expresses the statement that "it is better to have been
born than not to have been born" as an ultimate existential truth - a fact that
must necessarily obtain with respect to each individual child who comes into
the world, whether or not, for example, that child might be HIV-positive,
otherwise severely diseased or disabled, or born to abusive parents. I1 4 Tis
transposition of an argument from its public policy origins to a statement
offered for its umversal truth seems to me to be misplaced. One commenta-
tor has expressed it eloquently-
The sanctity-of-life argument is ambiguous. It may advance the view
that every life, no matter how severely defective, no matter how filled
with suffering, is necessarily .a good to the individual who lives it. Thls
seems simply false. Alternatively, it may express the view that every
human life has, or should have, value for us; that is, every life is worthy
of concern and respect. 3 '
Current social policy, wich respects autonomous patient choice for end-of-
life decision-making, reflects a humane awareness that there are conditions
under which life may be intolerable to the individual living it." 6 Surely that
can be just as true for infants as for those who have lived much longer.
137
134. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
135. Bonnie Stembock, The Logical Case for "Wrongfud Life, "HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Apr. 1986, at 15, 17
136. See generally SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, REFUSAL OF TREATMENT
LEGIsLATION (1991) (containing more than 70 statutes consisting of state legislation pertaining
to several kinds of advance directives - wherein patients while competent can provide for
decisions to refuse or withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment under certain conditions -
including "living will" documents, in which patients detail conditions under which they wish
to refuse or halt medical treatment, and durable powers of attorney and surrogate decision-
making'statutes, which enable individuals to select persons to make choices for them once they
become incompetent); 1 SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, RIGHT-To-DIE COURT DECISIONS
(1976-1986) (analyzing 26 significant court decisions in this area of law); 2 Id. (1987-1989)
(analyzing 23 significant court decisions in this area of law); 3 id. (1990- ) (analyzing 13
significant court decisions in this area of law). Some surrogate decision-making statutes name
individuals to make end-of-life choices for patients who have failed to commit their wishes to
writing. See generally UNiF RIGHTS OF THE TERmINALLY ILL ACT, 9B U.L.A. 127 (Supp.
1994). The Patient Self-Determination Act, part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990, requires health care providers receiving federal funds to inform patients about their
rights under state law and to document whether or not patients have health care directives.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (Supp. V 1993).
137 Several judges have noted the connection that exists between "right-to-die" policy
and "wrongful life" cases. See, e.g., Turpin v Sortim, 643 P.2d 954, 962 (Cal. 1982) (in
bank) ("[A]t least in some situations - public policy supports the right of each individual to
make his or her own determination as to the relative value of life and death."); Procanik v
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Even if one concedes that children who owe their existence to assisted
reproduction are virtually certain to find their lives to be net benefits rather
than net burdens, a social policy choice that is content to rest upon this
rminmum threshold as the appropriate criterion for acceptability strikes me
as highly questionable. In the section of his book titled "Preventing
Prenatal Harm to Offspring,"'38 Professor Robertson offers the proposition
that pregnant women who have not decided to abort have a strong
responsibility to engage in certain behaviors and to avoid others m order
to ensure that their children will be born as healthy as possible.'39 He
distinguishes the "unavoidable harm" implicated by the procreative choice
to reproduce under circumstances in which the child is bound to be born
handicapped in some manner from the "avoidable harm" that might result
from a woman's prenatal actions." ° Conduct during pregnancy (other than
the abortion choice itself) is not part of procreative liberty, in his view;141
the harm principle dictates that a woman's rights of autonomy and bodily
integrity may be circumscribed at the point at which her choices might
impinge on the interests of another, "the child that the fetus will be-
come."142 Indeed, Professor Robertson believes that these interests are
Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 771 (N.J. 1984) (Handler, J., concurring m part and dissenting m part)
("[If we accept that] individuals may lawfully determine m a necessitous or exigent setting that
nonlife may reasonably be preferred over life [as we do in 'right-to-die' cases,] then we
ought to conclude that damages flow from the deprivation of this right and that the infant
plaintiff should be reasonably compensated."); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 933 (rex.
1984) (citing "right-to-die" cases to note that "[t]he judgment of a parent or guardian may be
substituted for that of the child when the child is incompetent and unable to decide whether
he prefers nonlife to an impaired existence"). Also consider the following scenario posed by
Joel Feinberg:
Suppose that after the death of your body a deity appears to you and
proposes to give you an option. You can be born again after death (reincar-
nated), but only as a Tay-Sachs baby with a painful life expectancy of four years
to be followed by permanent extinction, or you can opt for permanent extinction
to begin immediately I should think you would have to be crazy to select the
first option.
Joel Feinberg, Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, 4 Soc. PHIL. &
POL'Y 145, 164 (1989).
138. ROBERTSON, supra note 1, 173-94.
139. See id. at 173.
140. See d. at 178.
141. See ed.
142. Id. at 179.
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sufficiently strong to justify regulation 14 and, in some instances, criminal
sanctions1" for behavior potentially deleterious to the future child, although
"the better policy in most cases will be to rely on information, education,
and access to treatment. " 145
Robertson's contentions are highly controversial, to say the least, and
discussion of them is clearly beyond the scope of this Article. What I wish
to suggest here is that the same consideration - the optimal (not minimal)
well-being of .he future children - is the appropriate basis upon which to
shape social policy with regard to the use of assisted reproduction.1" This
assertion is not novel. In the area of family law, generally, issues
involving the welfare of children are invariably decided on the ground of
serving the children's best interests, even when doing so means infringing
upon the rights or interests of adults. 47
The resolution of issues raised by assisted reproduction need not, in
fact, go so far. Determining the "best interests" of children whose
existence we are planning is a speculative enterprise. We do not even
know the nature or extent of potential harms that might uniquely affect
children born of assisted reproduction. Commentators raise such consider-
ations as the effect upon self-identity when one does not know who one or
both genetic parents are,' the confusion of "too many parents" or the
143. See id. at 182 (contemplating possible exclusion of women from certain areas of
workplace if sufficient connection with harm to fetuses can be demonstrated and regulation is
narrowly drafted); id. at 186-90 (discussing potential "prenatal seizures," such as incarceration
for substance abuse and possible court-mandated cesarian sections).
144. See id. at 182-86.
145. Id. at 180.
146. Cf. sources cited supra note 14.
147 See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 9.4, at 359 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that child's welfare is "primary concern" in child
abuse or neglect proceedings); id. § 19.1, at 788 (noting that child's best interest is governing
principle in custody disputes); id. § 19.4, at 797 nn. 3-4 (citing statutes and case law adopting
child's best interest as primary criterion for custody); id. § 19.6, at 825 (criticizing doctrine
of constitutional "parental right" to child custody as coming "dangerously close to treating the
child m some sense as the property of his parent"); id. § 20.5, at 891 (noting that, in context
of termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, "JImlost courts concede that the welfare of
children is a compelling state interest"); id. § 20.6, at 905 (noting that some statutes allow
parental rights to be terminated when necessary to serve child's best interests); id. § 20.7, at
909 (noting that best interest of child is "ultimate standard for both agencies and courts" in
adoption proceedings).
148. See, e.g., ANDREWS, supra note 32, at 278-80; BARTHOLET, supra note 14, at 228-
29; FIELD, supra note 14, at 54; OVERALL, supra note 14, at 111; R. SNOWDEN ET AL.,
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psychological harm perhaps engendered by custody battles when surrogate
mothers wish to maintain contact with the babies that they have deliv-
ered, "'49 and the need for full and accurate family medical profiles.150 A
child born to a postmenopausal woman15 1 or a child born as a clone of
someone else, especially when that child is named after a deceased sibling,
may suffer from a heavy burden of preconceived expectations. 52
Deliberate planning for nontraditional families, such as single-parent
situations or households in which both parents are of the same gender,
poses other issues. The possibilities raised by increasing sophistication in
genetic engineering may present the most far-reaching and unpredictable
problems likely to arise.
ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION: A SOCIAL INVESTIGATION 118-19, 171-72 (1983); Lon B.
Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL. L. REV 623, 669 (1991);
Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of the New
Reproductive Technologies, FERTILITY & STERILITY, Sept. 1986 (Supp. 1), at 1S, 60S; Ryan,
supra note 14, at 10; Walter Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family
Law, 69 VA. L. REV 465, 499-500 (1983); Keller, supra note 14, at 186.
149. See, e.g., FIELD, supra note 14, at 54-55; OTA, INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 227;
Martha A. Field, Surrogacy Contracts - Gestational and Traditional: The Argument for
Nonenforcement, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 12-13 (1992); Keller, supra note 14, at 187
Compare In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235-37 (N.J. 1988) (involving surrogate mother
battling with intended parents for custody of child) with Holder, supra note 14, at 52
(describing case of handicapped newborns resulting from surrogacy contracts and battles in
which both intended parents and surrogate mother deny custody). Both of these types of
custody battles may potentially cause psychological damage to the child.
150. See, e.g., ANDREWS, supra note 32, at 279-80; OTA, INFERTILTrrY, supra note 2,
at 227; SNOWDEN ET AL., supra note 148, at 176-77; Andrews & Douglass, supra note 148,
at 660-62; Annas, Regulating, supra note 14, at 413; Wadlington, supra note 148, at 499-500.
151. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
152. See Robertson, supra note 12, at 11-:12 ("[Tlhere could be special problems faced
by [a later born twin]. Its path through life might be difficult if the later born child is seen
merely as a replica of the first and is expected to develop and show skills and traits of the first.
This might be a special danger if the later born child is used as a replacement for an earlier
born child who has died."); Jerry Adler et al., Clone Hype, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1993, at 60,
61-62 (presenting situations in which couple, deciding that they like characteristics of
particular person, might decide to thaw clone of that person to be implanted m woman's
uterus); Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Cloning: Where Do We Draw the Line?, TIME, Nov. 8, 1993,
at 65, 68 ("[W]hat about the couple that sets aside, as a matter of course, a clone of each of
their children? If one of them died, the child could be replaced with a genetic equivalent.");
id. ("All parents know how hard it is to separate what they think a child ought to be from what
he or she actually is. That difficulty would be compounded - for both the parent and the
child - if an exact template for what the child could become in 10 or 20 years were before
them in the form of an older sibling.").
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IV Conclusion
Certainly, society as a whole, as well as the individuals involved in the
use of assisted reproduction, has a stake in the welfare of the future citizens
that we are deliberately creating - not only their physical health, but their
psychological and emotional well-being. We already have some parallels
upon which to base our judgments, such as the experiences of adopted
children or children from divorced or "blended" families. Careful
deliberation and due regard for potential pitfalls should enable us to
anticipate and to plan carefully to provide resolutions of social policy that
will accommodate not only the procreative desires of would-be parents, but
also the optimum conditions of health and nurturafice for their "children of
choice."

